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Abstract. The cyber threat against all parts of our societies is con-
stantly growing, and while some attacks are carried out by cyber crimi-
nals for financial gains, others have strong strategic values and are likely
to be carried out by nation state actors. One group of institutions that
experience the growing cyber threat is universities: Universities are at-
tractive targets because they often possess valuable research knowledge,
and because universities traditionally have promoted an openness cul-
ture. At the same time, they face challenges in maintaining a high level
of cyber security, since many people have system and physical access,
and because there are many legacy systems in use. In order to build
an e cient cyber defense it is crucial to understand the always chang-
ing threat picture, so the countermeasures can be adapted accordingly.
However, doing so requires updated information about the attacks from
a variety of sources. While many of these sources, e.g. threat assessment
reports from intelligence agencies, come with regular intervals or in case
of significant changes, this paper explores a way of getting real-time in-
formation about current attack attempts towards a specific university:
Honeypots. The paper contributes by discussing advantages and disad-
vantages of di↵erent kinds of honeypots in a university setting, and it
demonstrates how results can be achieved through actual honeypot im-
plementations. Our conclusion is that honeypots are a valuable supple-
ment to other sources of intelligence, but it is crucial to choose the right
types and architectures.
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1 Introduction
The increasing cyber risks in general are documented through multiple sources.
In the USA alone, o cial sources have estimated that malicious cyber activity
cost the U.S. economy between $57 billion and $109 billion in 2016, a number
that is only expected to grow. Universities are dealing with specific cyber secu-
rity threats due to to their handling of research data, as well as data required for
their normal operation, e.g. information about students and researchers. While
universities carry out a large variety of activities, they do not have typical or-
ganisational boundaries and therefore need to establish custom security policies
to accustom their needs [12].
Copyright © 2019 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons 
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A report published by Cisco in 2018 focuses on cyber security in the pub-
lic sector, with a particular focus on education. More than half of the higher
educational institutions (58%), reported that they had experienced at least one
security breach, a percentage which is the highest over all public sector indus-
tries. This type of breach is most of the time identified with damage to the
institution reputation. Nearly 51% of the attacks resulted in loss of money, in
total over 500.000$ for the universities [2].
The challenge has also been identified in a Danish context. The Danish De-
fence Intelligence Service Center for Cyber Security (CFCS) stated in February
2017 that foreign states are conducting acts of espionage against Danish re-
search. The curiosity is generated both from political and commercial motives,
but nonetheless assailants were interested also in the institutions infrastructures
that can be used for attacking other public Danish institutions [3]. It is an ongo-
ing discussion within the research and educational sector how these challenges
can be met without compromising on the openness culture of the universities.
As in other organisations, a number of initiatives are currently being taken
to heighten the level and matureness of cyber security in universities. Danish
universities are no exception, and the initiatives include awareness campaigns,
updated password policies, installation of IDS/IPS systems and so on. Ideally
these initiatives are taken based on an analysis of risks and consequences, but
we claim that often such analysis is based on a combination of assumptions
and outdated/partial information: Little is known about the actual and current
threat picture faced by each organisation.
In this paper, we investigate how honeypots can be used to achieve current
information about actual attempts of attacking universities. The work is based
on a master thesis project [8], and contains two main contributions. First it is
analysed which honeypots are more suited for a university setting, and second
the results of an actual honeypot deployment is presented and discussed.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we provide a
background on di↵erent kinds of honeypots and analyse which honeypots are
most suited for a university setting. Next, selected honeypots are deployed as
described in Section 3, and in Section 4 we present the results obtained. Section
5 presents the conclusion and discussions.
2 Background
A honeypot can be defined as a trap, where potential attackers are lured into
a seemingly operational network, which is really established in order to attract
hackers and study their behaviors. To serve this purpose, it is created to look as
realistic as possible from the outside, while at the same time containing relevant
tools that allow the operator of the honeypot to monitor and analyse the behavior
of visitors. An example of a honeypot is depicted in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Graphical display of how honeypots are working.
Based on the level of interactions determined by the availability of commands
and the feedback that an attacker is experiencing when he is trapped inside,
honeypots can be classified into three groups:
– Low-Interaction Honeypots (LIHP)
– Medium-Interaction Honeypots (MIHP)
– High-Interaction Honeypots (HIHP)
These will be described in the following.
LIHP - emulate a limited range of available services for the attackers to use.
The main characteristic is that these types of honeypot are not having an
operating system. Their main advantages are the facts that they are easy to
deploy and maintain, yet they are excellent statistical tools. However, they
are limited when it comes to detection of new attack patterns. [9]
MIHP - no operating system is present, but in contrast to LIHP they are
capable of keeping the attacker engaged by answering to his commands.
Nonetheless, the emulated services are more complex than LIHP. Both LIHP
and MIHP present a low risk of being compromised, determined by the pos-
sibility of commands.[9]
HIHP - this type of honeypots is o↵ering a real and unrestricted operating
system to the attacker, and therefore is more complex in deployment and
maintenance. Due to a large variety of information: monitoring services, at-
tack logs, data access and file traversing that are stored in these types of
honeypots, the processing of data needs to be done manually, and conse-
quently it requires more time for deployment and maintenance. Moreover,
these types of honeypots provide a high risk of compromise. [9]
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In Table 1 the information in relation to LIHP, MIHP and HIHP is grouped
into four levels Low, Medium, High and Very High based on the required initial
knowledge, amount of information, maintenance time and risk of being compro-
mised.
LIHP MIHP HIHP
real operating system no no yes
risk of compromise low mid high
wish of compromise no no yes
information gathering low mid high
knowledge to deploy low mid high
knowledge to develop low high high
maintenance time low low very high
Table 1. The table provided in [9] is summing up the principal characteristics of LIHP,
MIHP and HIHP.
In addition, honeypots can be also classified based on their function as either
Production or Research honeypots:
Research honeypots - are mainly used by educational, military or governmen-
tal institutions to gain information about the attackers’ tactics, techniques
and procedures(TTPs). This type of honeypots are not bringing direct value
to the organization and require high maintenance time, on the other hand
the type of information that they are providing is important for organiza-
tions to develop new policies to stay ahead of the cyber threats.[9]
Production honeypotss - are specific for companies and are mostly placed
inside production networks, since they present a lower risk of being com-
promised. These honeypots are used to increase overall security, as well for
decoy systems which works by deceiving the attackers and alerting the ad-
ministrators about the activity.
2.1 Review of Honeypot Usage
In this section, a short review of existing honeypot studies is provided. There
are several studies that were directed towards honeypots in the last years. Two
projects worth highlighting are a project carried out by German Telekom [4] as
well as the Leurre project [7]. Telekom used the information collected to protect
their own systems, but also shares the data with security vendors. Unfortunately
little has been published, and as such there are no further publications where
the data is evaluated [6]. The Leurre project was stopped in 2008, but their data
related to observed attacks was published.
Other large honeypot strategies include the NoAH project [1] and the Hon-
eynet project [11], while more recently a number of projects concentrate on a
30
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small number of sensors and a short period of time [6]. The honeynet project is a
collaborative project, that is focusing the research on the black-hat community
tools, tactics and procedures and then sharing the insight knowledge. The orga-
nization is composed from international security professionals who have deployed
honeynets with the goal of further analysing the results.
The Finnish security company F-Secure is using honeypots to determine the
landscape and the threat model of the years [5].
The data from these di↵erent projects provide useful statistics on the general
threat picture, and can be a help in determining for example which protocols and
countries to pay particular attention to. Also, much of the activity that is caught
comes from automatic scanners, which tries to scan all possible Internet hosts
without di↵erentiating between companies, universities, and other organisations.
However, they provide little insight into the particular threats towards universi-
ties. This challenge is studied further in the next section, where we analyse the
requirements for establishing a university honeypot.
2.2 University Honeypots
Educational and research institutions are special types of organizations due to
their variety of activities. Nonetheless, universities have claimed that due to bud-
get limitations and lack of trained personnel they are facing huge impediments
in relation to cyber security policies. In addition, the 2018 Cisco report over the
public sector is stating that universities have employed only half of the medium
number of security personal that other comparable organisations employ [2].
Therefore, a solution is needed which do not require a lot of time for deployment
and maintenance, while the information provided by the system should still be
valuable for the organizations.
Universities are sitting with large amounts of data that come in many forms
such as intellectual property, personal data from employees and students, as well
as research data from third parties, some of which can be business critical. For
this reason security is an important aspect. Also, while honeypots can provide
large amounts of data, in order to become valuable for universities this data need
to be organized in a manner that facilitates automatic processing.
LIHP are good choices. Not only do they have the lowest necessary time of
deployment and maintenance, they also present a low risk of being compromised
due to the fact that they are not having an actual operating system. Nonetheless,
the LIHP are able to provide an overview of the attacked protocols, the sources
of the attacks as well as combinations of passwords and user-names used when
services are probed. In addition, these type of honeypots are not requesting a
long time to be spent daily for monitoring, and data generated by them can be
structured for automatic processing. In addition to LIHP some MIHP might be
relevant to consider as well, given an individual assessment of added value in
terms of information gain versus the additional e↵orts in maintainance and risk
management.
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In the next section, the paper will go more in depth with the actual deploy-
ment of honeypots in a university environment.
3 Honeypots on AAU’s Network
The following section will present the honeypots of choice together with the
architecture and how they are integrated with the network of Aalborg Univer-
sity(AAU). There are many available honeypots, but some of them are already
outdated and can present security risks, and so we narrowed down the choice to
honeypots that are maintained and still in use. The chosen honeypots can em-
ulate common services used at universities such as SSH, FTP, HTTP, HTTPS,
SMTP and RDP.
Cowrie is a MIHP honeypot that is emulating SSH and Telnet protocols. It
is recording the interactions that an attacker is having with the honeypot.
Cowrie is chosen despite being a MIHP since it is the newest honeypot
to emulate SSH and Telnet, and since it is easy to setup and maintain.
Furthermore, it is considered secure to run since it is not running a real
operating system, and since the amount of o↵ered commands is limited.
Dionaea is a LIHP honeypot capable of o↵ering a number of protocols in-
cluding: Server Message Block (SMB), HTTP, FTP, Microsoft SQL Server
(MSSQL), and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP).
Heralding is a LIHP designed to store the used credentials. The emulated
protocols are Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Hypertext Transfer Pro-
tocol Secure (HTTPS), Post O ce Protocol 3 (POP3), Post O ce Protocol
3 Secure (POP3S) and Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP).
Mailoney is a LIHP that is mimicking a classic mail server by exposing the
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol(SMTP).
RDPY is a LIHP that imitates the Windows protocol, Remote Desktop
Protocol(RDP).
3.1 Honeypots Deployment
Honeypots were deployed using Docker which is an open-source platform for
running, developing and distributing applications. Docker o↵ers the possibility
of grouping all the necessary dependencies inside one package, named container,
which is o↵ering isolation, abstraction and security [10]. Therefore, the honey-
pots were deployed into individual containers to ensure isolation and also to
avoid any errors to escalate. In Figure 2 the honeypots relation with Docker is
demonstrated, and the approach is presented horizontally.
For bringing more value to the architecture, the honeypots were integrated
with AAU’s existing network, and the following subsection will present a general
overview of how the integration was made.
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Fig. 2. Overview of the honeypots integration with Docker.
3.2 Honeypots Integration with AAU’s Network
Docker was hosted on a Virtual Private Server (VPS) provided by AAU. Figure 3
gives an overview of the architecture. The VPS was configured on a small subnet
(X.X.X.113/29) that was sitting outside AAU’s main firewall, and a firewall
(see the figure) was setup by us to control the tra c to and from the VPS.
For this reason, the VPS had a principal network interface used exclusively for
administration purposes, the connection was established over SSH, and a number
of secondary network interfaces were created in software for the honeypots.
Fig. 3. Honeypots integration with AAU’s Network.
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Considering the design from a security perspective, tra c originated from
the VPS was not allowed to go back to AAU’s network. As a consequence all
tra c to the Internet was freely allowed, since it was also important to keep the
appearances and to not raise any suspicions for the attackers. In addition, four
secondary network interfaces were created and the IPs were distributed across
the docker containers. The primary containers behaviour was modified by as-
signing a public static IP address to every container in order to integrate them
with the existing AAU’s network.
All the interactions with the honeypots are stored individually in log files
and therefore a method to structure and analyze the files is presented in the
following subsection.
3.3 Logs Processing
Given this container based architecture, where the log files are saved individu-
ally, a method to centralize the logs was adopted. Graylog has been used as the
log management tool, and together with its dependencies it was deployed inside
Docker containers on the same VPS. Once the log files are sent to Graylog, their
management is handled by storing the information in Elasicsearch and the nec-
cessary Graylog settings in MongoDB. In Figure 4 the proposed architecture for
this part is presented in order to o↵er a better understanding of the components
and their relation:
Fig. 4. Overview of log files parsing architecture.
The following section will present and analyze the results recorded by the
honeypots by focusing on the probed protocols.
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4 Results Of Honeypots
The honeypots were initially started on May 13 2019, and their activity was
monitored for a period of 30 days. They were configured to monitor di↵erent
kinds of intrusions including scanning and login attempts: In the following, we
refer to these altogether as ”connection attempts”. During the recording period a
total number of 780.305 connection attempts were registered. The SSH protocol
was the one recording most of the attacks, but the following protocols were also
targeted: RDP, HTTP, TELNET and HTTPS. The majority of the sessions
created came from Ireland (72%), followed by Netherlands (20%), China (2%),
Jordan (1%), and Germany (1%).
In Figure 5 the top 10 countries based on the number of attempts are dis-
played. The countries presented are considered to be the last hop of the attacks,
since is not possible to identify from the logs if the attackers are using proxies.
Fig. 5. Top 10 most active countries based on the number of attempts.
IE = Ireland, NL = Netherlands, CN = China, JO = Jordan, DE = Germany, US = USA,
RU = Russia, TH = Thailand, PA = Panama, TW = Taiwan
In the following subsections the honeypots that were deployed will be pre-
sented one by one and their results will be described and analyzed.
4.1 Cowrie
Considering that the majority of the connections were addressed to the SSH
protocol generated by Cowrie it is valuable to get an overview of the activity.
There were a total number of 725.993 connection attempts oriented to the SSH
protocol. From the total number of connections nearly 240.000 were direct tcp/ip
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requests from the honeypot to a company based in Russia that is o↵ering di↵erent
Internet services, Ya.ru. Therefore, there is a clear tendency of using the attacked
machine as a proxy and launch attacks from that to other devices. However, it is
beyond the scope of this study to analyse whether the attacker actually knows
that he is inside a honeypot, which he could then deliberately try to use as a
proxy for his attacks.
4.2 Dionaea
Dionaea is the honeypot that is emulating the highest number of protocols.
Figure 6 provides an overview of the most attacked protocols, and the relation
with the source country is presented.
Fig. 6. Top 5 most attacked protocols and source countries.
Additionally, this honeypot was also registering usage of generic usernames
such as sa, root, admin, mssqla or server, together with passwords like 12345678,
password, 1qaz2wsx, abc123, and qwerty. Nonetheless, binary and bitstream files
were collected, but no thorough analysis was performed during the development
of this project.
4.3 Heralding
This honeypot demonstrated a trend in the attacks towards less secure protocols
such as HTTP. Moreover, Figure 7 shows the representation of top 5 protocols
together with the total number of attempts.
Fig. 7. Top 5 most attacked protocols in the Heralding honeypot.
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From the total number of attempts, a percentage of 32.30% were using combi-
nations of usernames and passwords such as admin-admin,root-root, postgresql-
postgresql and Cisco-Cisco. As such, attackers were inclined to use sequences
where the service name was used both as a username and password. Moreover
apart from the service names, usernames also include admin, super, superadmin,
user or support. Also additional passwords were used between the groups such
as root, cisco, admin, or support.
4.4 Rdpy and Mailoney
For Rdpy and Mailoney the number of connections were lower than for the other
honeypots, but nonetheless interesting: Rdpy was registering attacks from Jor-
dan, USA, Russia, Ivory Coast and China. The main number of the attacks were
originating from an USA IP address that was already known as an infected de-
vice primarily used for DDOS attacks via IoT devices.
Furthermore, for Mailoney the attacks were linked back to USA, China, and
Ireland. The origins of the connections were the IP addresses that are known to
host malicious botnet activities. The activity that was most recorded was to use
this honeypot as an open relay by trying to connect to other mail-servers for
sending spam emails. Domains such as sh-chi-us-gp1-wk108.internet-census.org
and zx2.quadmetrics.com were contacted, all of which are already blacklisted
domains due to spam activity.
5 Conclusion
In the last years, cyber security has gotten on top of the agenda in many public
and private organisations: The risks are increasing both from cyber criminals
driven by profit and nation states driven by more strategic interests. In this
situation, universities are facing themselves with a high risk due to their valu-
able research data as well as personal data for their operations, while at the
same time trying to maintain an open culture. Having a good and actual view
of the current attack picture is crucial in order to take the right countermea-
sures. This paper investigated how honeypots can contribute to achieving such
a better picture: Through an analysis of di↵erent honeypot techniques it was
found that low interaction honeypots can provide valuable information while
at the same time keeping the risks low and minimizing the exposure of crit-
ical information. Among the results were that during a 30 day period more
than 725.000 connection attempts were oriented towards SSH with the majority
coming from Ireland, Netherlands and China. Looking at other protocols, many
connections were coming from also China, India and Philippines. It was also
revealed which protocols were most often targeted, along with the most com-
monly guesses of usernames/passwords. The results demonstrate that honeypots
can provide valuable and timely information to universities about the current
threat picture. There is however a trade-o↵ between ease of use, configuration
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and analysis on one hand, and the amount of information that can be achieved on
the other. However, it does not help anyone that information is collected if it is
not actually used. In order to make the information operational, future research
could focus on how to present and integrate the results for the risk management
organisation, but also on how a collaborative approach could be taken among
universities to identify trends and ongoing attacks as early as possible.
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